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Reform at Risk — Mandating Participation in Alternative
Payment Plans
Scott Levy, B.A., Nicholas Bagley, J.D., and Rahul Rajkumar, M.D., J.D.

I

n an ambitious effort to slow
the growth of health care costs,
the Affordable Care Act created
the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) and
armed it with broad authority to
test new approaches to reimbursement for health care (payment
models) and delivery-system reforms. CMMI was meant to be the
government’s innovation laboratory for health care: an entity
with the independence to break
with past practices and the power

to experiment with bold new approaches. Over the past year, however, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) has
quietly hobbled CMMI, imperiling
its ability to generate meaningful
data on strategies for reducing
spending on Medicare and Medicaid.
The controversy involves the
abrupt termination (or, in one
case, narrowing) of several “mandatory” payment programs. When
it created CMMI, Congress aimed
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to overcome the obstacles that
had impaired some of the earlier
payment-reform efforts undertaken by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS). In
particular, CMMI was given the
power to waive any part of
the Medicare statute, parts of the
Medicaid statute, and various antifraud provisions when designing
its payment models. To insulate
CMMI from the vagaries of the
annual appropriations process,
Congress supplied the agency with
1663
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a permanent appropriation averaging $1 billion per year. Most important, Congress gave the secretary of HHS the authority to
expand a successful program “on
a nationwide basis.”
The fledgling agency moved
carefully at first. Instead of requiring providers to participate in
new payment programs, CMMI
asked for volunteers. Many providers volunteered to become accountable care organizations, to
develop patient-centered medical
homes, and to accept bundled
payments. Some of these approaches showed promise. The
Pioneer Accountable Care Organization Model — under which
groups of providers agreed to be
“accountable” for the cost and
quality of the care they provided
and could then share in any savings generated — produced $118
million1 to $280 million2 in savings in its first year and an estimated $105 million in its second
year.3 The YMCA’s Diabetes Prevention Program, which was tested under CMS authority, provided
intensive lifestyle and dietary
coaching to patients with prediabetes, which helped them lose
weight and reduced hospital admissions. It, too, appeared to save
money.
But CMMI soon came to appreciate the challenges involved in
using volunteers to evaluate new
programs. Organizations that volunteer to participate in alternative payment models are likely to
be systematically different from
those that don’t sign up. They may
be more organizationally sophisticated, more experienced with assuming risk, and better at adapting to such models — or,
depending on the design of the
model, they may be more likely
to have high preparticipation baseline spending. A payment model
1664

that “works” for volunteer organizations might not work for other
organizations, which is why voluntary programs don’t always
provide insight into whether a
payment approach ought to be
rolled out on a nationwide basis.
Making participation in a payment program mandatory allows
the agency to correct for these
selection effects. But such programs must be designed carefully.
Conscripting all providers would
eliminate the opportunity to have
a control group, thus hampering
evaluation of a payment model’s
causal effects. There are also
problems associated with enlisting a randomly selected group of
providers: forcing one provider
— and not its competitor — into
a payment program could put one
or the other at a competitive disadvantage and could result in odd
market dynamics. Given the
choice, some patients might opt
to go to a hospital that wasn’t
participating in a CMMI program,
for example. This type of patientlevel selection could skew evaluation. The better approach — and
the one that CMMI has embraced
— is to enroll all providers in
randomly selected geographic
areas in a given payment program, allowing providers in other
areas to serve as controls. Such
mandatory programs were also
designed to enlist a large, diverse
sample of providers in order to
yield generalizable results.
In 2015, CMMI chose hospitals in specified regions to test
bundled payments for hip and
knee replacements. In 2016, the
agency established a similar project for hip and femur fractures
and for cardiac events. Mandatory
payment programs were lauded
in some quarters but provoked
strong, organized opposition in
others. Nearly 200 members of
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Congress and several provider organizations (including the American Medical Association, the
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, and the Federation
of American Hospitals) decried
mandatory payment programs,
with some calling them heavyhanded and others alleging illegality.
They found a receptive audience in President Donald Trump’s
first HHS Secretary, Tom Price, a
former orthopedic surgeon and
an unsparing critic of mandatory
payment programs. On taking office, Price paused the Obama-era
mandatory bundled-payment programs; some months later, he
formally ended the programs for
cardiac events and hip and femur
fractures. HHS also sharply reduced the size of the program
for hip and knee replacements,
draining the study of much of its
statistical power. Simultaneously,
the agency announced that it
would recommit itself to voluntary payment programs.4
The backpedaling is unfortunate and unnecessary. Mandatory
programs are crucial tools for
evaluating new payment models,
and they stand on a solid legal
foundation. When Congress vested CMMI with broad authority to
test new payment models, it emphasized that it wanted the agency
“to determine the effects of applying such models . . . on program
expenditures . . . [and] quality of
care.” Why ask CMMI to measure
the effects of new models, but
deny it the authority to adopt the
best available scientific methods?
Even more fundamentally, Congress authorized HHS to adopt
successful payment models nationwide. It would not have delegated
to CMMI the extraordinary power
to reshape Medicare and Medicaid while prohibiting the agency
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from amassing the highest-quality
evidence about which models are
effective.
In addition, CMMI’s authorizing statute prohibits the courts
from reviewing the agency’s “selection of organizations, sites, or
participants.” This provision also
reinforces the conclusion that Congress meant to allow CMMI to
insist on participation. What good
would it do to prohibit volunteers
from suing over their “selection”?
They have, after all, volunteered.
The prohibition makes sense only
if Congress expected that some
providers might be required to
participate.
Statements from the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) confirm that Congress
anticipated mandatory payment
programs. In response to a question from then-Congressman Tom
Price, the CBO wrote that its initial budget projections for CMMI

“assumed that the center would
conduct demonstrations using a
broad array of innovative approaches” and that it “was not
surprised when CMMI designed
a demonstration in which participation was mandatory because
that approach offers several important advantages.”3
If the legal objections to mandatory payment programs are insubstantial, the federal government’s decision to abandon such
programs is difficult to defend.
Without question, they are critical to developing robust evidence
on strategies for cutting spending and improving quality. Current
HHS Secretary Alex Azar testified
before Congress that he is open
to mandatory participation in new
payment models. We believe he
should follow through — or we
will lose a key tool for learning
new ways of constraining health
care spending.
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